PUBLIC PURCHASES AND IRREGULARITIES IN BIDDING PROCESSES: THE GENERIC OBJECT AND THE OVERESTIMATION IN ITS QUANTITY

Abstract

This article analyzes specific irregularities in the description of the object of the bid and their consequences for the bidding process. Specifically, it addresses the problem of the generic description of an item to be bid, as well as its overestimation. Both irregularities can indicate problems in the competitiveness of the bidding process, leading inexorably to, at the very least, the loss of bargaining for the best prices in public procurement, or, depending on the case, overpricing. The study is developed by examining the doctrine and case law that guide the subject, verifying the arguments regarding the various illegalities that appear in bidding processes concerning generic objects and the quantitative overestimation of them. As a result, it is found that the irregularities in question, in addition to nullifying the bidding process, may reveal evidence of improper or criminal acts related to the frustration of the competitive nature of a bidding process, or simply the loss of the opportunity to better safeguard the public interest with regard to the contracted prices.